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Abstract. A common precept of decision analysis under uncertainty is the
choice of an action which maximizes the expected value of a utility function.
Savage’s (1954) axioms for subjective expected utility provide a normative
foundation for this principle of choice. This paper shows that the same set
of axioms implies that one should select an action which maximizes the
probability of meeting an uncertain target. This suggests a new perspective
and an alternate target-based language for decision analysis. We explore
the implications and the advantages of this target-based approach for both
individual and group decision-making.
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1. Introduction
Two of the most important approaches to decision making are optimizing
and satisficing. In a world with no uncertainty, where each feasible action d
leads to a (known) consequence xd , the optimizing approach postulates that
the agent should choose an action d which maximizes his value function
v(d). The satisficing approach, instead, explicitly recognizes the cost or
the practical impossibility of searching among all possible actions for the
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optimal one; see Simon (1955). Therefore, it suggests that the agent should
establish some target t and then pick the first action d which meets the target.
Rational decision making is based on the optimizing principle. However,
the satisficing approach has some appealing features because thinking about
targets is very natural in many problems. Moreover, as it is often easier to
formulate targets and monitor their achievement, they are prominent in the
decision processes of bureaucracies and organizations.
The purpose of this paper is to bring a target-based language to decision
making under uncertainty, while maintaining the optimizing principle as a
guide to rational decisions. The satisficing approach is sufficient but not
necessary to make target-based decisions.
When there is uncertainty, an action d may lead to different outcomes,
usually summarized in a random consequenceXd . Given a target t , then, the
agent can only assess the probability P(Xd  t) that the action d leads to a
consequence that meets the target.According to the optimizing principle, the
agent should choose an action d which maximizes the probability v(d) =
P(Xd  t) of meeting the target t ; see Manski (1988).
This simple target-based model is not complete because there may be
uncertainty about the target itself. For example, many businesses trying to
meet customer requirements set these as their target. But, while government
contractors frequently have exact specifications to satisfy, commercial firms
must usually view their customers’requirements as uncertain.The target may
not even be known in individual contexts. Many individuals have the goal of
“being successful”; but only a very few know precisely which combinations
of money, leisure time, culture, etc. must be attained to achieve this goal.
Hence, we relax the assumption of a known target and replace t with a
random consequence T . The ensuing target-based decision model prescribes
that the agent should choose an action d which maximizes the probability
v(d) = P(Xd  T ) of meeting an uncertain target. Borch (1968) develops
a closely related approach.
To assess the normative appeal of this model for decision analysis, we
consider the subjective expected utility theory perfected in Savage (1954).
It provides an axiomatic foundation which implies that the agent should
choose an action d which maximizes his expected utility v(d) = EU(Xd)
with respect to a subjective probability distribution.
Quite unexpectedly, the target-based model satisfies the Savage axioms!
As we prove in the appendix, there is no way to tell if an agent abides by Sav-
age’s axioms is maximizing his expected utility or is maximizing the proba-
bility of meeting his uncertain target. A similar result for the von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s axiomatization is given in Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996).
This implies that Savage’s axioms allow us to use two different languages
in formulating our decision models – the language of utilities or the language
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of targets. As it turns out, after a trivial normalization, translating between
the two languages is simply a matter of setting U(x) = P(x  T ), that is,
interpreting the “utility” of a consequence x as the subjective probability
that x will meet the target. The choice between a utility-based language
or a target-based language for decision theory ultimately comes down to a
question of convenience.
We explore the implications of this point of view in the rest of this paper,
which is organized as follows. Section 2 compares the target-based model
with the utility-based model for decision analysis under uncertainty. The
following three sections suggest a few applications where the target-based
model may have a comparative advantage over the utility-based formulation.
More precisely, Section 3 considers individual decision making while Sect. 4
looks at group decision making; finally, Section 5 examines multiattribute
decision making, both at the individual and at the group level. Section 6
summarizes and offers our conclusions.
2. The target-based model
Suppose that the agent has to rank several possible decisions. Assume for
simplicity that the set C of consequences is finite and completely ordered
by a preference relation . Denote by Pd his probability distribution for the
random consequence Xd associated1 with a decision d. The expected utility
model suggests that the ranking be obtained by using the value function
v(d) = EU(Xd) =
∑
x
U(x)Pd(x), (1)
where U(x) is a von Neumann and Morgenstern (NM-)utility function over
consequences.
The target-based model, instead, suggests using the value function
v(d) = P(Xd  T ) =
∑
x
P (x  T )Pd(x), (2)
where P(x  T ) is the cumulative distribution function of the uncertain
target and T is stochastically independent of Xd .
Both models are linear functionals over the probability distributions as-
sociated with a decision. This formal similarity may be carried one step
further. Note that U is bounded and increasing. After having normalized its
range to [0, 1],U has all the properties of a cumulative distribution function
(c.d.f.) over consequences. By a standard probability-theoretic argument,
1 Let P be the agent’s subjective probability distribution on the state space S. The
probability distribution Pd is induced by the act d : S → C through the equality
Pd(Xd = x) = P(d(s) = x).
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we can associate to the c.d.f. U a random consequence T stochastically in-
dependent ofXd ; see the appendix. We can thus viewU(x) as the probability
that the target T is below x; that is,U(x) = P(x  T ). This definition turns
the NM-utility function U into a probability distribution and makes (1) and
(2) formally identical.
The idea that the NM-utility function U should be interpreted as a prob-
ability distribution may appear unusual but, in fact, NM-utilities are proba-
bilities. Consider how the agent assesses the utility U(x) of a consequence
x. For simplicity, assume that there is a best consequence b and a worst
consequence w, so that b  x  w. Then U(x) is the probability p that
makes the agent indifferent between getting x for sure or playing a lottery
where he has probability p of getting b and probability (1 − p) of getting
w; that is, U(x) = p.
It is the utility-based language that baptizes the probability p as the NM-
utility of x, as some decision theorists have noted long since. For instance,
Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaifer (1995) equate utility with the “indifference prob-
ability”. Similarly, both Behn and Vaupel (1982) and Howard (1992) speak
of utility as a “preference probability” and remark that the manipulation of
preference probabilities is in many respects similar to the treatment of real
probabilities. Nonetheless, they are very careful in keeping preference prob-
abilities distinct from real probabilities because a preference probability is
not associated with a potentially observable event.
The target-based model acceptsU(x) as a real probability only after hav-
ing introduced the notion of an uncertain target T : the potentially observable
event associated with the probability U(x) is that x does meet the target.
As a result, the target-based model can avoid the notion of a cardinal util-
ity function U(x) over consequences. This has a major pedagogical advan-
tage. While both target-based and utility-based decision making demand an
understanding of probabilistic choice, the utility-based model additionally
requires a comprehension of cardinal utility assessments. For target-based
reasoning, the agent must only be able to handle probability judgements.
This has a potential for simplifying the assessment procedure for U(x).
For instance, assume that consequences are monetary outcomes described
as changes to the current endowment. A simple way to elicit the distribution
of his target is to let the agent draw a probability density u(x) over the real
line and then estimate his c.d.f. as
U(x) = P(x  T ) =
∫ x
−∞
u(t) dt. (3)
In the utility-based language, the probability density u(x) corresponds to
the marginal utility associated with the NM-utility function U . It may be
interesting to compare the difficulty of eliciting a probability density u(x)
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versus the task of assessing the marginal utility ofU . Berhold (1973) exploits
a similar insight to estimate certainty equivalents.
We have drawn two probability densities for T in Fig. 1. On the left,
there is a decreasing probability density u1(x) that suggests a conservative
assessment of the target: the most likely targets to meet are the worst out-
comes. On the right, there is a symmetric unimodal probability density u2(x)
that suggests an uncertain target very close to the status quo, represented
by the mode of the distribution and corresponding to a zero change in the
endowment.
Fig. 1. Two probability densities
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the targets asso-
ciated with these probability densities. By (3), the conservative assessment
on the left of Fig. 1 leads to the concave c.d.f. U1(x) on the left of Fig. 2,
which is equivalent to a concave NM-utility function. Therefore, in using a
target-based model, global risk aversion stems from a conservative assess-
ment of the target.
Fig. 2. Two c.d.f.’s for the target
Looking at the right-hand side of Fig. 1, the unimodal probability density
for the target corresponds to the S-shaped c.d.f. U2(x). This is equivalent to
the S-shaped utility function of prospect theory, according to which people
tend to be risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses; see Kahneman
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and Tversky (1979). In the target-based language, this amounts to saying that
perceiving the uncertain target as (more or less) symmetrically distributed
around the status quo leads to risk averting choices when gains are involved
and to risk seeking decisions when losses are at stake.
Many variations on this theme are possible, but we report only one more.
Suppose that the probability density for the target is unimodal and positively
skewed (e.g., a lognormal distribution). Again, the mode represents the sta-
tus quo. Consistent with prospect theory, the resulting distribution function
U(x)will not only be concave over gains and convex over losses, but steeper
for losses than for gains. In the target-based language, a unimodal probabil-
ity density for the target with fatter right tails implies a behavior that is less
risk averse over gains than it is risk seeking over losses.
3. Individual decision making
The previous section and the appendix show that there is a formal equiva-
lence between the target-based model and the utility-based model. There-
fore, the decision analyst may wish to transfer insights from one model to the
other. This section considers a few examples concerning the relationships
between expected utility models and target-based reasoning in individual
decision making.
3.1. State-dependence
Suppose that an agent is interested in maximizing his expected utility. By
our result of formal equivalence, his decision process can be modelled as if
he is maximizing the probability of meeting an uncertain target T with c.d.f.
U(x), provided that the target is stochastically independent of the random
consequences to be evaluated. Since it is always possible to make sure that
the target satisfies this assumption, there are no restrictions in going from
the utility-based model to the target-based formulation.
More care, instead, is needed for going in the opposite direction because
the target-based model allows for higher generality. Suppose that the agent
is interested in maximizing the probability of meeting an uncertain target
T . If the target T is stochastically independent of Xd , we know that
P(Xd = x, x  T ) = P(x  T )Pd(x). (4)
Therefore, the value function is
P(Xd  T ) =
∑
x
P (Xd = x, x  T ) =
∑
x
P (x  T )Pd(x),
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which is equivalent to an expected utility model if we defineU(x) = P(x 
T ). But when the assumption of stochastic independence does not hold, (4)
may fail and we have to resort to more general formulations.
There are situations in which the assumption of stochastic independence
is too strong. Suppose that there are two different decisions d1 and d2 both
resulting in x when the states are respectively s1 and s2 	= s1. For exam-
ple, assume that X1 and X2 are the (nominal) rates of return on two stock
portfolios and that there are two states s1 = H and s2 = L representing
respectively high and low inflation. Imagine that X1 = x in state H , while
X2 = x in state L. The otherwise identical nominal rate of return x should
probably be weighed differently if it obtains in a state of high or low inflation.
The assumption of stochastic independence, instead, entails
P(x  T |s = H) = P(x  T |X1 = x)
= P(x  T |X2 = x) = P(x  T |s = L),
so that the probability that the nominal rate x meets the target cannot depend
on the level of inflation.
In this example, the assumption of stochastic independence fails because
the evaluation of x should be state-dependent. Adopting a utility-based lan-
guage requires that we analyze the situation by introducing a state-dependent
utility functionU(x, s) for the consequence x in state s; see Karni (1985) or
Schervisch, Seidenfeld and Kadane (1990). However, this is not an easy task
because the eliciting of U(x, s) requires the agent to compare the cardinal
utility of x across different states. Moreover, since there may be different
ways in which the stochastic independence of the target may fail, there is
no easy general recipe to convert a target-based model into a utility-based
model. It is possible that target-based reasoning may offer a more convenient
approach.
Continuing in the example, the agent might, for instance, assess a target
TH for high inflation and a (possibly different) target TL for low inflation.
Different targets for different states of the world can be easily understood
and formulated. Conditional on the states of the world, the agent may view
the nominal rate of return Xd on the stock portfolio d as a random variable.
Thus, he would have to use the value function
v(d) = P(Xd  T )
= P(Xd  TH |H)P (H)+ P(Xd  TL|L)P (L), (5)
where T represents the state-dependent target and P(H) and P(L) are the
(subjective) probabilities for the two states.
Note that (5) has a hierarchical structure which makes it very easy to
tackle the decision problem in steps. First, the agent assesses which are the
relevant states and assesses their probability. Second, for each relevant state
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the agent estimates his uncertain target and the (conditional) distribution
of Xd . Third, he computes the probability that Xd would meet his state-
dependent target T s in state s. Fourth, he aggregates these assessments using
the laws of probability theory. The target-based model makes the decision
problem easy to divide and conquer even if stochastic independence does
not hold.
3.2. Untying correlations
There are some important cases where the lack of stochastic independence
in a target-based model may be overcome by recoding the problem. In gen-
eral, the uncertain target T and an arbitrary random consequence X to be
evaluated may be stochastically dependent. However, assume that there exist
an increasing transformation g : C → R and a random number Y such that
g(T ) + Y and g(X) + Y are stochastically independent random numbers.
Note that Y = Y (X) may depend on the random number X that we are
considering.
Define a new target T ∗ = g(T ) + Y and a new random number X∗ =
g(X)+Y . By construction, T ∗ andX∗ are stochastically independent. More-
over, since X ≥ T if and only if g(X) ≥ g(T ) and g(X)+ Y ≥ g(T )+ Y
if and only if X∗ ≥ T ∗, we have
P(X ≥ T ) = P(g(X) ≥ g(T )) = P(g(X)+ Y ≥ g(T )+ Y )
= P(X∗ ≥ T ∗),
where X∗ and T ∗ are stochastically independent. In this situation, we can
transformT andX and obtain new random numbersX∗ andT ∗ which satisfy
stochastic independence.
One special case of this model corresponds to a situation whereX and T
are nominal rates of return and the only source of correlation is the under-
lying (random) rate of inflation J . If we let Y = − log(1 + J ) and g(x) =
log(1+x), thenX∗ = log[(1+X)/(1+J )] and T ∗ = log[(1+T )/(1+J )]
are defined in real terms and may be taken to be stochastically indepen-
dent. An appropriate recoding of targets and payoffs may eliminate some
sources of correlation and recover stochastic independence. It is obvious that
stochastic independence still holds if, for reasons of clarity, one introduces
the transformation h(x) = ex − 1 and makes reference to the (random) real
rates of return X∗∗ = h(X∗) and T ∗∗ = h(T ∗).
Another situation where the source of correlation may be eliminated is the
following. Given a random consequence X, assume that the agent evaluates
X by using an a posteriori target T which is a function of his a priori target
T ∗ andX itself. This may correspond to a situation where the agent “adapts”
his target to the random consequence he is evaluating. This kind of effect
Decision analysis using targets instead of utility functions 61
is observed quite commonly in real life. The agent who has access to some
very promising random consequence X raises his expectations. The agent
who is offered a poor prospect lowers his target.
In particular, suppose that the a priori target T ∗ is stochastically inde-
pendent of X and that there exists some increasing function g : C → R
such that g(T ) = ag(X)+ (1−a)g(T ∗) with a = a(X) < 1. Since X  T
if and only if g(X) ≥ g(T ), we have
P(X  T ) = P(g(X) ≥ g(T )) = P(g(X) ≥ g(T ∗)),
where g(X) and g(T ∗) are stochastically independent. Recoding the prob-
lem in terms of the a priori target eliminates the source of correlation.
For these cases where stochastic independence may be recovered, we can
convert the target-based formulation into a standard expected utility model.
We think that this conversion may help the agent to make better decisions
in some cases. For example, suppose that Xd represents the (nominal) wage
that the agent expects to earn in the next year if he accepts job d while
T represents the (real) income that he feels to be necessary to maintain a
satisfactory standard of living. The agent, moreover, ignores what the rate
of inflation J is going to be over the next year; therefore, T is a random
variable.
As shown in Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997), the agent is often
confused about nominal and real values. Framing this problem in a utility-
based language may lead him to a poor decision because the agent ends up
assessing the utility of Xd without discounting away the inflationary effect
and does not know how to take inflation into account. Using target-based
reasoning, the agent may be asked to describe his target T in real values and
his wage expectations Xd in nominal values, if this makes him feel more
confident about their assessment. When the probability distributions for Xd
and T have been elicited, it should not be difficult to show him how to correct
his estimates and account for inflation. This procedure may be useful in many
situations where the agent faces similar cognitive limitations: a firm which
sets performance targets related to the growth of the market, a government
that must impose different social security contributions based on changes
in the demographic trends or environmental regulations based on trends in
pollution, etc.
3.3. Projecting future preferences
Applied decision analysis assesses the current preferences of an agent and
uses them as predictors of what his preferences will be in the future. In
particular, with some possible discounting to account for time preferences,
the current NM-utility function is often used as the best estimate of the
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NM-utility function in the future. Target-based decision theory suggests an
alternative way of modelling the relationship between today’s preferences
and tomorrow’s preferences.
The target-based model interprets the current utility function as a de-
scription of the agent’s uncertainty about his current target. Similarly, it
must interpret his future utility function as describing the uncertainty about
his target in the future from today’s viewpoint. In most cases, it is reasonable
to expect greater uncertainty about the future target than about the current
target. Hence, the target-based approach indicates that today’s estimate of
the utility function in the future might differ systematically from today’s
utility function.
There are many ways to model this systematic difference. For concrete-
ness, we consider only one example which should however suffice to convey
the main point. Suppose that the consequences in C are real numbers and
that the current utility function U(x) corresponds to a normal c.d.f. for the
uncertain current target. Once U(x) is assessed, then, we may compute its
meanm0 and its variance v0. For convenience, we can think ofm0 as the cur-
rent status quo.As discussed in Section 2, a normal distribution for the target
generates risk-averse preferences for x ≥ m0 and risk-seeking preferences
for x ≤ m0.
Now, suppose that we expect the status quo to evolve over time according
to a random walk, that is, that there exists a sequence {Yk} of independent
and identically distributed zero-mean random variables such thatmt = m0+∑t
k=1 Yk. If we denote the variance of any Yk by σ 2, this implies that today’s
estimate of the variance of mt is tσ 2. Hence, from today’s viewpoint, the
uncertainty about the future target Tt consists of two parts: the uncertainty
about how the target varies around its mean, which is measured by v0; and
the uncertainty about how the mean of the target varies, which is measured
by tσ 2.
The uncertainty about the future target, then, is described by a normal
c.d.f. Ut(x) with a mean of m0 and a variance of v0 + tσ 2. Reinterpreting
Ut(x) as today’s utility function for the agent’s future preferences at time
t , we see that this results in less risk-aversion for x ≥ m0 and less risk-
seeking for x ≤ m0 than would be implied by today’s utility function for the
agent’s current preferences. That is, in this example the increased uncertainty
about the future favors a more aggressive behavior over gains and a more
conservative attitude over losses. However, depending on the details of the
stochastic process underlying the evolution of mt , we may obtain a variety
of conclusions.
When tailored to a specific situation, this approach may help the agent
appreciate the implications of a target-based approach; see Cyert and de-
Groot (1975) for a similar approach using a utility-based language. Note
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that, as time unfolds and new information obtains, the estimate of mt will
change. Therefore, the estimate of Ut today will differ from the estimate of
Ut tomorrow. This has two implications: on the one hand, the change inUt is
likely to result in temporal inconsistency; on the other hand, the agent is now
given a way to take into account how the future arrival of information will
impact his willingness to implement today’s choices and to predict how his
preferences may change. This should be particularly important in a situation
where the agent must decide today which options he wants to leave open in
the future.
The option-based approach to decision making usually presumes that
the agent’s uncertainty about his prospects increases as his time horizon
becomes longer. Options are valuable because they increase the flexibility
of the agent’s future decision set and thus work to reduce the downside of
his uncertainty. Hence, the value of an option also tends to increase with the
length of the time horizon. On the other hand, the example suggests that in
some cases the agent’s uncertainty about his requirements (as summarized
by T ) will also increase with time, making him more willing to take risks
over gains. This reduces the attractiveness of an option taking values in the
domain of gains. A longer time horizon may increase both the uncertainty
about the prospects (enhancing the value of the option) and the uncertainty
about the target (curtailing the value of the option). In general, the net impact
of longer time horizons on option values may not be obvious.
4. Group decision making
In many applications of decision analysis, a group of agents is trying to reach
an agreement on some decision problem under uncertainty. These situations
may involve club memberships, corporate bureaucracies, academic faculties,
parliamentary assemblies or judiciary committees.
From the viewpoint of utility-based models, there are two major ap-
proaches to the analysis of this kind of problem. The first is theoretically
oriented: it assumes that there are n agents and that each agent i has a known
individual NM-utility function Ui(x) and considers the problem of aggre-
gating the n individual utility functions into a group utility function Ug(x);
see Harsanyi (1955). The second approach is process oriented: it has the
members of the group share their utility functions and focus on identifying
alternatives that appear beneficial from the perspective of each agent; see
Keeney (1992).
In this section, we present some of the possible contributions of the
target-based model to either approach. As is customary in the utility-based
model, we assume that agents do not misrepresent their preferences or their
probability assessments. Consistent with the previous discussion, we will
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interpretUi(x) as the c.d.f. of an uncertain target. The target-based language
helps to raise a preliminary issue that is often neglected.
4.1. Common target
In some situations, there is a group target Tg that the agents would like
to pursue collectively. For example, the members of an academic faculty
may share the common target of achieving excellence for their department.
To make the target of excellence operational, we can define it as being
listed among the top five schools in a given national ranking. Even when
all members of the department share this objective, they may still disagree
about how likely a specific outcome x is to meet the common target. For
instance, they may have different opinions about how many publications and
positive teaching evaluations are necessary to achieve their shared target of
excellence.
In other situations, each agent i has his own individual target Ti and the
group tries to choose a course of action which takes into account these (pos-
sibly conflicting) targets. This may be the case if each member of the faculty
has the target of promoting his own reputation. Advancing the excellence of
the department, then, would not necessarily be a commonly shared target.
These situations are known as problems of social choice.
While both the situations with one common target and those with many
individual targets fall into the realm of group decision making, they should
be kept distinct. Formally, let Ui(x) represents agent i’s uncertainty about
the target. When the agents share a common target Tg and agent i offers his
own honest assessment of the group target, then
Ui(x) = Pi(x  Tg),
where Pi denotes i’s subjective probability for Tg. On the other hand, if the
agent is honestly reporting about his own target Ti , then
Ui(x) = Pi(x  Ti).
We must attach a different interpretation to Ui depending on whether the
agents share a common target or have individual targets. Switching to the
utility-based language, we see that this difference is easily lost unless we
do not qualify Ui(x) separately: in the case of a common target, Ui(x)
summarizes agent i’s own view of what should be the group utility function;
in the case of individual targets, Ui(x) describes his individual preferences.
It seems, then, that the utility-based notation is not sufficiently rich to capture
this important difference.
When the agents share a common target Tg, Ui(x) represents agent i’s
subjective probability distribution for Tg. The problem of specifying a group
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utility function Ug as a function of the individual utility functions can
be reformulated as the problem of combining the probability distributions
U1, U2, . . . , Un into a single probability distribution Ug. This problem has
a long history in probability theory and many solutions have been advanced;
see Genest and Zidek (1986). For example, given a (sure) consequence x, let
Ui(x) be the probability that x will meet the target Tg according to agent i. If
we follow the well-known linear opinion pooling rule studied and axioma-
tized in, among others, Bacharach (1975), deGroot and Mortera (1991), and
Keeney (1976), then Ug(x), the group probability for x meeting the target,
would be an average of the individual probabilities.
Given a common target, the process-oriented approach to group decision
making would have the members of the group exchange their probabilistic
assessments of Tg and discuss the evidence or the information supporting
these assessments, in order to facilitate the identification of critical uncer-
tainties and the pooling of opinions. Let us consider an example. Suppose
that the members of the executive board convene to discuss the firm’s target.
One executive might say that the minimum acceptable target for the pre-tax
profit is between 8% and 12%. Another executive might place it between
9% and 11%. A third executive might add that it should be between 10%
and 14%. At that point, there would be an extensive debate over what is
acceptable or not. Why does the third executive consider it essential to have
a profit of at least 10%? Why does the first executive think it might be ac-
ceptable to have a profit as low as 8%? While reaching a consensus cannot
be guaranteed, this process should foster convergence.
4.2. Individual targets
Things change substantially when the agents do not share a common target,
so that Ui(x) represents agent i’s subjective probability distribution for his
own target Ti . In the utility-based approach, this situation is described as a
social choice problem with cardinal utilities; see d’Aspremont and Gevers
(1977) or Roberts (1980). In spite of a few positive results along the lines
of Harsanyi (1955), there is an ample literature about the impossibility of
reasonable general-purpose aggregating procedures; see Hylland and Zeck-
hauser (1979) or Seidenfeld, Kadane and Schervish (1989). Thus, we must
resort to developing robust solutions for specific classes of problems; see, for
instance, Eliashberg and Winkler (1981) or Keeney and Kirkwood (1975).
Target-based reasoning may offer a systematic approach for some spe-
cific problems. Suppose that the n individual targets T1, T2, . . . , Tn are
stochastically independent. This mildly restrictive assumption holds when-
ever the target of each agent is defined on a different probability space. In
other cases, some appropriate transformations similar to those in Section 3.2
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may untie the correlations and lead to a formulation in which the individual
targets are stochastically independent.
The aggregation of the individual targets into a group objective function
Ug should be based on a principle of fairness. One possible criterion is that
a consequence be acceptable to the group only when it meets the individual
target of each member of the group. The group should therefore aim to
maximize the probability of meeting everybody’s target. If we let T(n) =
max{T1, . . . , Tn} denote the n-th order statistic, this would result in
Ug(x) = P(x  T(n)) =
n∏
i=1
Pi(x  Ti) =
n∏
i=1
Ui(x) (6)
being the probability that x meets everybody’s target. The random variable
Tg associated with Ug would therefore be used as the “group benchmark”
to rank any feasible decision d by the probability P(Xd  Tg) that it meets
this benchmark. Note that, if we assume independence of Tg from the ran-
dom consequences Xd , this is in turn equivalent to the maximization of the
expected value of the group utility function Ug.
Other criteria, of course, are possible. For example, a different principle
could be that a consequence is acceptable to the group whenever it is accept-
able to at least one member of the group. If we let T(1) = min{T1, . . . , Tn}
denote the first order statistic, the “group benchmark” Tg would be dis-
tributed according to the c.d.f.
Ug(x) = 1 − P(x ≺ T(1)) = 1 −
n∏
i=1
[Pi(x ≺ Ti)]
= 1 −
n∏
i=1
[1 − Ui(x)]
(7)
and the value function would be again P(Xd  Tg). Similarly, we might
follow the principle of deeming acceptable to the group any consequence
that meets the target of at least k of the n members of the group. This would
lead to a more complicated form for Ug.
This target-based viewpoint suggests many ways of aggregating individ-
ual expected utility functionsUi’s into an aggregate expected utility function
Ug. The implications of these and other possible fairness principles, how-
ever, must still be explored in depth. As a first step in their study, we state
one simple result. Note that the two formulations in (6) and (7) are dual. If
we assume that Ui is absolutely continuous for all i, it is a simple exercise
in differentiation to establish the following.
Suppose thatUi is convex for all i; then theUg implied by (6) will also be
convex. Similarly, if Ui is concave for all i, then the Ug implied by (7) will
Decision analysis using targets instead of utility functions 67
also be concave. That is, if we start with all the agents being risk-seeking,
trying to meet everybody’s target makes the group also risk-seeking. Analo-
gously, if we start with risk-averse agents, trying to meet at least someone’s
target makes the group also risk-averse. One simple example will suffice
to illustrate this point: suppose that each agent i has an exponential utility
function Ui(x) = 1 − e−λix . According to (7), the group utility function
would be
Ug(x) = 1 − e−(
∑n
i=1 λi)x,
so that the group would also be risk averse. Furthermore, since (
∑
i λi) is its
coefficient of risk aversion and
∑
i λi > maxi λi , the group would exhibit
more risk aversion than any of its members. This conforms with the group
polarization effect empirically observed by Doise (1969) and Moscovici and
Zavalloni (1969).
5. Multiattribute decision making
The focus of this section is multiattribute utility theory under uncertainty.
Assume that objectives have been specified and that n appropriate attributes
α1, α2, . . . , αn have been identified. If xi denotes a specific level for attribute
αi , a (sure) consequence is described by the vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
reporting the level of each attribute.
An important problem of multiattribute utility theory is how to construct
the overall utility function U(x) as a function of the n single attributes
x1, x2, . . . , xn. Many assumptions are possible, but the most important is
utility independence. This states that the conditional preferences over ran-
dom consequences involving only αi do not depend on the levels of the
other attributes. This implies the existence of a single-attribute utility func-
tion Ui(xi) for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
According to Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. 224), the role of utility in-
dependence in multiattribute theory is similar to stochastic independence
in multivariate probability theory. In particular, it implies that the multiat-
tribute utility function is a multilinear function of the utilities associated
with the various attributes. Furthermore, the range of both the overall and
the single-attribute utility functions can be normalized to be [0, 1].
5.1. Multiattribute individual decisions
We can interpret this result by considering an individual multiattribute utility
problem and switching to the target-based language. Suppose that reaching
the overall target is a function of the levels x1, x2, . . . , xn of the single
attributes; that is, there exists a set A such that the overall target is attained
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if and only if x ∈ A. In particular, assume that A is decomposable as the
cartesian product of n subsets Ai such that x∈A if and only if xi ∈Ai for
all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
If we assume stochastic independence of the attributes, the multiattribute
utility function can be written as
U(x) = P(x∈A) =
∏
i
P (xi ∈Ai) =
∏
i
Ui(xi), (8)
where Ui(xi) = P(xi ∈Ai) is interpreted as the probability that the target
for the single attribute i is met. As in the standard multiattribute utility
formulation, the overall probability of successU(x) is a multilinear function
of the probabilities Ui(xi) of meeting the single-attribute targets, for i =
1, 2, . . . , n.
A related problem is found in the statistical theory of reliability, which
expresses the reliability of a system as a function of the survival proba-
bilities of its various components. In particular, for coherent systems with
independent components, it is a standard result that the survival probability
of the system is a multilinear function of the survival probabilities of each
component; see Barlow and Proschan (1975). If we interpret the survival of
a component (respectively, of the system) as the event that a single-attribute
(respectively, the overall) target is met, the two formulations are mathemat-
ically equivalent.
This implies that the problem of maximizing a multiattribute utility func-
tion can be mapped to the problem of minimizing the probability of failure
in a fault tree (more generally, an event tree). This suggests a tool to cir-
cumvent the well-known limitations of assuming utility independence in
multiattribute utility assessment.
Consider, for instance, an individual trying to assess how the multiat-
tribute utility of a house depends upon its price, its location and its facilities.
The assumption of utility independence is necessary to quantify how much
of the overall utility of a house depends on the single-attribute utilities of
price, location and facilities. It postulates that each single attribute must
contribute to the overall utility independently from the other attributes. This
strong assumption is often implausible.
In contrast, reliability theory employs event trees which describe how
the achievement of a higher-level objective is influenced by various combi-
nations of lower-level objectives. For example, an event tree might specify
that a house is worthwhile by considering whether it has a reasonable price
or if it has both a satisfactory location and adequate facilities. Taking expec-
tations over this tree defines the probability of achieving the overall target
as a function of various combinations of price, location and facilities. Equa-
tion (8) reduces to U(x) = P(x∈A), where A is not necessarily a cartesian
product and therefore cross-dependencies may be explicitly modelled.
Decision analysis using targets instead of utility functions 69
Further work is needed to assess the possibility of framing multiattribute
utility assessment as a reliability problem on an event tree, but this approach
holds some promise. For example, we can develop an alternate way of de-
riving the multiattribute utility function by identifying the combinations of
lower-level targets whose attainment is necessary for the achievement of the
overall target.
Define first a (possibly uncertain) acceptable target for each of the higher-
level and lower-level objectives. Thinking of a pyramid with the overall
target T at the top, there are second-level targets Ti supporting T ; and
then third-level targets supporting the second-level targets Ti , etc. For each
higher-level target, specify how its achievement is related to the attainment
of its (possibly uncertain) lower-level targets: whether we need to meet all
of them; or if it suffices to meet at least one; or if we have to meet at least a
majority of the supporting lower-level targets; etc. Finally, we would com-
pute the probability of achieving the higher-level targets as the probability
of attaining the right combination of lower-level targets.
Since this enables us to translate the fundamental objectives hierarchy
into the standard event tree of reliability analysis, we are able to exploit the
hierarchical structure of the event tree to compute these probabilities. This
makes it possible to use a “bottom-up” approach to the computation of the
probabilities of meeting the higher-level target.
5.2. Multiattribute group decisions
Some important applications of decision analysis concern multiattribute
group decisions. Due to limitations of space, we focus on a comparison be-
tween the utility-based and the target-based approaches which only scratches
the surface of the problem. For concreteness, suppose that we are to consider
a major corporate decision involving the chief officers. Both approaches
would begin by trying to develop collectively an understanding of which
lower-level attributes support the higher-level attributes.
Successively, the utility-based approach generally interviews each agent
separately and tries to summarize his assessments in a set of numbers. For
example, each of the executive officers might be asked to assess his willing-
ness to pay for market share, profits and innovation. The assessments from
each of the executive officers would then be presented to the entire board of
executives and the utility-based decision analysis would creatively search
for a decision that each officer deems superior to the status quo.
The target-based approach can usefully complement this approach, by
suggesting that the previously constructed hierarchy of attributes be viewed
as an event tree. This should help to focus the group discussion on the like-
lihood of an acceptable performance in a higher-level objective conditional
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on the attainment of acceptable (or unacceptable) levels of performance on
the lower-level objectives. For example, the financial officer may believe
that an acceptable corporate performance is solely determined by whether
the profit is sufficiently high; the operations officer may think that the only
key component is an acceptable level of innovation; and the sales officer
may hold that it is uniquely determined by a reasonably high level of the
market share. At this point, the dialogue should focus on why there are such
pronounced differences between the different perspectives. Possibly, this
dialogue would lead the group to unearth some higher-level goal like long-
run prosperity as the ultimate criterion, with different members of the group
disagreeing over whether or not a target of long-run prosperity requires an
acceptable performance in all three dimensions. By confronting the officers’
views about higher and lower-level targets, this process should make it easier
to foster convergence of opinions than a utility-based perspective would.
The critical contribution of the target-based approach is that it may help to
translate much of the disagreement between individual utility functions into
a disparity of opinions about which (and how) some targets impact other
targets and over the probabilistic assessments. We believe that there are
situations in which the group can discuss how various targets impact other
targets much more easily than they can settle disagreements over values. It
is likely that some of the existing methodologies for handling uncertainties
(e.g., influence diagrams or tornadoes) might also be used to help modelling
uncertainties about targets. Hence, we feel that a target-based approach to
multiattribute group decision making may turn out to be easier to use than
utility-based decision theory.
6. Conclusions
Most of the current discussion in decision theory is based on utility functions.
This paper shows that there exists an alternate target-based language for
thinking about decision making and that there are contexts in which it may
be more useful than the traditional utility-based language. This suggests that
there might be a role for target-based models in decision analysis.
This paper is far from having exhausted the range of possible applica-
tions of target-based models. However, some potential advantages should
be apparent.
– We can replace the somewhat esoteric concept of an NM-utility function
by the more widely understood notion of a target. This may facilitate the
teaching of decision analysis.
– We can relate the concept of risk aversion to the notion of the agent’s
uncertainty about his target. This may facilitate the description and the
understanding of the causes of risk-aversion.
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– We can offer some guidelines on how to model changes in the agent’s
future utility function from the current one. This may facilitate practical
applications of utility theory.
– We can suggest a new and simple approach to the formulation of a group
utility function. This may facilitate both the analysis and the process of
aggregating individual preferences.
– We can show that reliability theory and multiattribute utility theory are
more intimately related than previously thought. This may facilitate new
insights or new models.
For these reasons, we think that the target-based language seems to offer
considerable promise for the theory and practice of decision analysis and
that this should warrant it further consideration.
Appendix. Savage’s theorem
This appendix reviews Savage’s theorem and shows how to interpret it in a
target-based language. We begin with a detailed statement of the theorem
in the utility-based language. Let S be the state space, C the set of (sure)
consequences and D the set of acts. Assume for simplicity that C is finite.
There is a preference relation ′ over acts which induces a preference rela-
tion  over consequences such that δx ′ δy if and only x  y, where δx
denotes the degenerate lottery yielding x for sure. Hence, C is a completely
ordered finite set.
Theorem 1 (Savage, 1954). Suppose that the agent has a preference re-
lation ′ over all acts which satisfies axioms P1–P6. Then the following
statements hold.
(i) There exists a unique finitely additive probability measure P on S.
For each decision d, this probability measure induces a probability
distribution Pd over the consequences associated with d.
(ii) There exists a [utility] function U on C such that U(x) ≥ U(y) if and
only if x  y. The [utility] function U is bounded and unique up to
increasing affine transformations.
(iii) The value function v over D defined by v(d) =∑x U(x)Pd(x) repre-
sents ′. That is, d1 ′ d2 if and only if v(d1) ≥ v(d2).
The boundedness of U is proved in Fishburn (1970) for the general case
of a set C with an infinite number of consequences, where the additional P7
axiom is required to extend the representation in (iii) to all acts. Here, it is
an obvious corollary to the finiteness of C.
In part (ii) of the theorem, we have put in brackets the word “utility” to
highlight the fact that the interpretation of U as a utility function is not part
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of the statement of the theorem. The meaning of U is open. To provide a
reinterpretation, note that (ii) establishes that U is bounded and unique up
to increasing affine transformations. Picking the appropriate transformation,
we can normalize the range of U to be the interval [0, 1] and change the
statement in part (ii) to:
(ii. a) There exists a unique function U : C → [0, 1] which is increasing
with respect to .
This functionU can be interpreted as a distribution function onC, defin-
ing a probability measure Q on C such that U(x) = Q{y : x  y}. By a
standard probability-theoretic argument, we can pick the probability space
(,,-) where , = [0, 1] and - is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and
construct a random consequence T : , → C with distribution function
U : C → [0, 1]; see, for instance, Proposition 3.4 in Fristedt and Gray
(1997). Assuming , ∩ S = ∅, we see that the random variable T turns out
to be stochastically independent of any Pd .
We interpret the random consequence T as the (subjectively) uncertain
target of the agent. The probability distribution of T is given by U ; that
is, P(x  T ) = U(x). Hence, what previously was the utility function is
now the distribution function of the uncertain target: U(x) is the probability
that x meets the target. Of course, the more preferable is x, the higher the
probability that it meets the target; that is, x  y if and only ifU(x) ≥ U(y).
Under this interpretation, part (ii) of the theorem becomes:
(ii. b) There exists a (stochastically independent) random target T with a
unique [probability distribution] function U : C → [0, 1].
Carrying this interpretation over to part (iii), which in the utility-based
language states that v(d) is the expected utility of d, we obtain the target-
based formulation of Savage’s theorem:
Theorem 2. Suppose that the agent has a preference relation ′ over all
acts which satisfies axioms P1–P6. Then the following statements hold.
(i) There exists a unique finitely additive probability measure P on S. For
each decision d, this probability measure induces a random conse-
quence Xd with probability distribution Pd .
(ii) There exists a (stochastically independent) random target T with a
unique [probability distribution] function U : C → [0, 1].
(iii) The value function v over D is the probability that the random conse-
quence Xd meets the uncertain target T :
v(d) =
∑
x
U(x)Pd(x) =
∑
x
P (x  T )Pd(x) = P(Xd  T ).
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